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PLURALISM APPLIED: A CONCORDANT
APPROACH TO SELECTING CONTRACT
RULES
SAMUEL F. ERNST*
Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency
theory), which are concerned with promoting rules that enhance societal wealth
and utility. Contract rules can also bejustified by rights-based theories (such
as promissory and reliance theories), which are concerned with protecting the
contractual freedom and interests of the individual parties to the contract. Or,
contract rules can be analyzed through the lenses of a host of other theories,
including critical legal theory, bargain theory, and so on. Because no single,
unitary theory can ever explain the complex body of laws and societal
conventions surrounding contracts, the best rule to govern any particular
situation is the one that can bejustified by multiple normative theories. Such
an approach would stand the best chance of achieving consensus, and would
acknowledge the insight of pluralism theorists-that no single unified theory
can explain the civil law. This Article applies a concordant approach to
selecting contract rules to address the question of whether a parent company
should be held liable in tort for directing the termination of a contract entered
into by its subsidiary.
Under ordinary circumstances, asimple breach of contract does not give
rise to tort liability and punitive damages; one cannot tortiously interfere with
one's own contract. But the courts around the country are deeply divided on
the question of whether parent companies are immune from tort liability for
inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract. Some courts hold that because the
parent and subsidiary share common interests, the parent is completely immune
from tort liability, just as though it were a party to the contract (Category 1).
Some courts take the similarly formalistic approach that because the parent
and subsidiary are technically separate ntities, the parent enjoys no immunity
from tort liability (Category 2). Some courts impose tort liability only if the
parent acted against the business interests of the parent and subsidiary or
committed an independent tort (Category 3). Some courts impose tort liability
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even if the breach of contract was in the business interest of the parent and
subsidiary if the parent company's actions were "wrongful," which can be
something less than tortious behavior (Category 4).
This Article presents an exhaustive survey and categorization of these
conflicting rules and then applies normative contract theory to determine which
is the best approach. In particular, the two most dominant contract law
theories of our time are applied to the issue: efficiency theory and rights-based
theory.
Applying efficiency theory to the problem at hand, this Article begins with
the proposition that, in order to facilitate efficient breaches of contract, no tort
liability should be imposed. However, once one takes into account the
underlying false assumption of efficiency theory that commercial actors always
act rationally, allowing for tort liability to be imposed in those situations where
the parent does not act out of business judgment makes sense.
When rights-based theory is applied to this issue, it raises questions as to
whether breach should be penalized to honor the promise made to the non-
breaching party and to protect the non-breaching party's reliance on that
promise. However, rights-based theory would also argue for protecting the
parent company's autonomy by allowing it to reject a promise it never accepted
and to decline to honor reliance it never induced-but only if the parent is
acting out of rational business interest. Accordingly, the parent company
should be afforded autonomy in choosing to terminate a contract it did not
bargain for (so long as it pays compensatory damages). If the parent
company's actions are not taken for rational business reasons, but rather for
reasons of spite, malice, or oppression, then the law should punish and deter
such behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One cannot tortiously interfere with one's own contract.' Rather, according
to the Restatement of Torts, only "[o]ne who intentionally and improperly
interferes with the performance of a contract ... between another and a third
person" is liable in tort for causing a breach of contract.2 This stands to reason
in a society grounded in freedom of contract because "along with the celebrated
freedom to make contracts goes a considerable freedom to break them as well."3
Accordingly, courts do not generally punish or make an example of parties who
breach a contract through the award of punitive damages.4 The breaching party
should be ordered to compensate the victim of the breach for the harm caused
1. See Knickman v. Midland Risk Servs.-Ill., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 458, 461-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
("Plaintiff does not dispute the basic rule that an entity cannot be liable in tort for interfering with its
own contract.").
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (emphasis added).
3. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 756 (3d ed. 1999).
4. See id. § 12.8, at 787 n.17 (alteration in original) (citing Addis v. Gramophone Co. [1909] AC
488 (HL) 494 (appeal taken from Eng.) ("[D]amages for breach of contract [are] in the nature of
compensation, not punishment.")).
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by the broken promise, but society does not seek to punish and deter breach of
contract in the same way that it seeks to punish and deter torts.6
This black letter rule can be justified by two dominant theories of contract
law: efficiency theory and rights-based theory.
Efficiency theory generally addresses problems in contract law by asking
which solution increases overall social welfare by resulting in the most efficient
use of resources and an increase in societal wealth.8 Efficiency theorists argue
5. Such compensation can take various forms. It can be compensation for the victim's expected
gains under the contract (expectation damages), compensation for the victim's expenses incurred in
reliance on the contract (reliance damages), or disgorgement of value the victim has given to the
breaching party pursuant o the contract (restitution damages), plus any consequential damages caused
by the breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (Purposes
of Remedies); id. § 347 (Measure of Damages in General); id. § 349 (Damages Based on Reliance
Interest); see also L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936) (discussing the restitution interest, the reliance interest, and the
expectation interest).
6. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 787 ("No matter how reprehensible the breach,
damages are generally limited to those required to compensate the injured party for lost expectation,
for it is a fundamental tenet of the law of contract remedies that an injured party should not be put in a
better position than had the contract been performed.").
7. Stephen A. Smith explains that normative contract law theories can be divided into utilitarian
theories, which justify contract rules as serving society generally, and rights-based theories, which
justify contract rules as upholding the rights of the individual parties to a contract. STEPHEN A. SMITH,
CONTRACT THEORY 106-07 (2004). According to Smith, the "best known and most important group
of utilitarian justifications of contract law" are efficiency theories. Id. at 107. Among rights-based
theories, Smith posits that the dominant theories are promissory theory, reliance theory, and transfer
theory, but that promissory theory is the most 'orthodox' and "provide[s] the best answer to the analytic
question" of how to describe the justification for particular contract rules. Id. at 142-43, 142 n.48. For
the purpose of this Article, I discuss rights-based theory as a general concept, but focus primarily on
promissory theory and reliance theory. Different terminology and categories are also available and
can be quite useful. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 271-91 (1986); SMITH, supra at 142 n.48 (dividing contract law theories into "party-based"
theories (comprised of will and reliance theories), "standards-based" theories (comprised of efficiency
and fairness theories), process-based theories (comprised of the bargain theory of consideration), and
Barnett's own "consent-based" theory (which he describes as a rights-based theory and which Stephen
A. Smith cites to as a transfer theory)). According to Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, on the other
hand, the world is divided up into efficiency and autonomy theory (which appears to be a term for
rights-based theories). Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543 n.1 (2003). For convenience, this Article generally employs Stephen A.
Smith's terminology.
8. SMITH, supra note 7, at 107. Robert A. Hillman refers to this variety of efficiency theory as
"'neoclassical' law and economics," to be distinguished with a more recent efficiency theory that
focuses on "transaction costs and their effect on choice of contract governance structures." ROBERT
A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY
THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 214 & n.9 (Aulis Aarnio ct al. eds., 1997) (quoting Ian R. Macneil,
Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory
Apparatus, "75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1981)).
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that greater wealth or utility will sometimes result if a party breaches a contract
than if the contractual promise is fulfilled.9 This happens when the gains to be
made under an alternative contract (or through no contract at all) will be greater
than the cost of compensating the victim of the breach for the harm to its
expectation under the contract.'0 It follows that efficiency theory favors a rule
against punitive damages for a simple breach of contract." Punitive damages
would deter these "efficient breaches" and result in a waste of the wealth and
utility they would otherwise create.12
Unlike efficiency theory, which is primarily concerned with how contract
law can promote social welfare, rights-based theory views contract law as
protecting the rights of the individual parties to the contract.'3 In particular,
contract law should protect the right of individuals to bind themselves through
contracts (i.e., freedom of contract) by enforcing the promises enshrined in
contracts, or by protecting the reliance interest individuals have in contracts.14
The pioneer of the promissory theory of contracts, Charles Fried, wrote that
"[t]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but
in respect for individual autonomy and in trust."'" It follows that if a party
breaks a contractual promise, the only way to protect freedom of contract is for
the law to enforce that promise; the breaching party "should be made to hand
over the equivalent of the promised performance."'6 The appropriate remedy
for breach of contract is expectation damages because "[t]he expectation
standard gives the victim of a breach no more or less than he would have had
had there been no breach-in other words, he gets the benefit of his bargain."'7
Fried explains why damages for breach of contract should be no less than
compensatory damages under a rights-based theory.'8
9. See John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 277, 291 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 291-92 (1970).
10. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 151 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed.
2011).
11. SMITH, supra note 7, at 418.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 107.
14. As noted above, Smith divides rights-based theories into three major categories: promissory
theory, reliance theory, and transfer theory. See supra note 7. This Article will focus on promissory
theory and reliance theory.
15. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16
(1981).
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See id at 17-27.
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Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz complete the picture by explaining
why a rights-based theory of contract counsels against supra-compensatory
damages for breach of contract, such as punitive damages.19 Markovits and
Schwartz hypothesize that a contract is a dual promise: "either to trade goods
or services to buyers or to make a monetary transfer to buyers, equal to the
value the buyers would realize from receiving the goods or services [i.e., an
expectation value]." 20 It follows that compensatory, expectation damages are
favored over supra-compensatory, punitive damages because they do not
impose an obligation greater than what the contracting parties agreed to and
thereby protect the breaching party's freedom of contract.21
Hence, there are strong theoretical arguments across dueling theories of
contract law to justify the old chestnut of a principal that there are no punitive
damages for a simple breach of contract.22 And it follows from this that one
23cannot tortiously interfere with one's own contract. Breach of contract is
permitted, not punished.2 4
But what of the more complicated situation where a parent company directs
its wholly owned subsidiary to breach a contract? This might happen for a
variety of reasons. When a parent acquires a subsidiary, the subsidiary brings
with it various baggage, some good, some bad, including ongoing contractual
obligations with other companies. The parent may seek to terminate the
contract for legitimate, business related reasons. For example, the parent may
be able to negotiate better terms with a different supplier, or may be able to
satisfy the contract needs internally. On the other end of the spectrum, the
parent may terminate a subsidiary's contract out of personal malice or spite
19. Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy and the Promissory Basis of
Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 799, 811 (2012).
20. Id. at 808.
21. Id at 811.
22. There is a more recent body of scholarship questioning this first principal of contract law.
Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz note that "[a] growing chorus of increasingly prominent critics
argues against limiting contract remedies to vindicating a disappointed promisec's contractual
expectations." Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 805-06 (citing Richard R.W. Brooks, The
Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual
Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law,
93 CAL. L. REv. 975 (2005); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105
MICH. L. REv. 559 (2006); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. I
(1989); Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1551 (2009); Scana
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. 708 (2007)).
Grappling with this questioning of first principals is beyond the scope of this Article, which takes as a
given premise that contract law does and should seek to compensate, rather than punish, a simple
breach of contract.
23. See Knickman v. Midland Risk Servs.-lll., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 458, 461-62 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
24. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 787.
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toward the victim of the breach, even if doing so is not in the best interest of
the shareholders. Somewhere in between is the situation where a parent
acquires a subsidiary for the purpose of terminating the subsidiary's contracts
with competitors of the parent. Once the acquisition is made, this would appear
to be in the business interest of the parent and subsidiary. To the extent such
behavior harms competition, it would presumably be in the realm of antitrust
law to deter such behavior. Is it nonetheless a tort that courts should punish
under a theory of intentional interference with contract?
The courts are deeply divided on these questions, with conflicting views
among the states' highest courts and among the federal courts of appeals
applying state law.25 Part II of this Article analyzes notable rulings from around
the country to arrive at the conclusion that there are at least four different
approaches to the question of whether and when a parent company may
terminate the contract of a subsidiary.
A. Category 1 Cases: Absolute Immunity
Some courts hold that because the parent and subsidiary share common
interests, the parent is, in practical effect, a party to the contract and should
enjoy complete immunity from tort liability. I refer to these cases as Category
261 cases.
B. Category 2 Cases: Absolute Liability
Other courts adhere to the formalistic rule that because the companies are
technically separate, a parent enjoys no protection from such tort liability. This
Article refers to this technical, black letter approach as Category 2.27
C. Category 3 Cases: The Rational Business Interest Approach
A third group of cases apply the rule that the parent is immune from tortious
interference with contract if it is acting in the business interest of the parent and
subsidiary companies in terminating the contract at issue and if it does not
commit an independent ort. Under this rule, if the parent acts out of irrational
malice or personal animus toward the victim of the breach in a manner that is
against the business interests of the parent and subsidiary, it should be punished.
But if the parent company directs the termination of a subsidiary's contract for
rational business reasons, then it is not liable in tort unless, of course, its actions
25. See infra Part 11.
26. See infra Section H.A.
27. See infra Section II.B.
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constitute an independent ort (such as fraud). I refer to these cases as Category
283 cases.
D. Category 4 Cases: The Multi-Factored Approach
And then there is California, the pioneer of Category 4 cases. California
cases provide that "the privilege of a parent or subsidiary corporation to
interfere with the contractual relationship of the other 'is at most a qualified one
dependent for its existence upon the circumstances of the case."'29 California
cases require parent companies to prove two elements in order to enjoy
immunity for directing the termination of a subsidiary's contract: that the parent
"(a) does not employ improper means, and (b) acts to protect his interest from
being prejudiced by the relation."3 0 Hence, even if a parent acts in the best
business interest of the parent and subsidiary in terminating a subsidiary
contract, tort liability will still lie if the parent uses "improper means."
Improper means is not explicitly defined. Unlike with Category 3 cases,
improper means can be something less than an independent ort and less than a
violation of the antitrust laws. I refer to these cases as Category 4 cases.
The vagueness of Category 4 cases arises from the fact that the standard
emerges out of the multi-factored test provided by Section 767 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled "Factors in Determining Whether
Interference is Improper."32 That section does not address the situation of a
parent and subsidiary company, but considers a variety of non-exclusive factors
to determine if any actor's intentional interference with a contract is improper,
including "the relations between the parties."3 Courts following this approach
28. See infra Section II.C.
29. GHK Assocs. v. Mayer Group, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 168, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added) (quoting Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vomado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
30. Asahi Kasci Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(quoting Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1939))).
31. See infra Section II.D.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
33. Id. The Section provides as follows:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not,
consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
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caution that the parent-subsidiary relationship is but one factor, which does not
preclude consideration of the other six factors that are listed in the
Restatement.34 Because these other factors include such things as "the nature
of the actor's conduct" and "the actor's motive," the parent can be liable even
if it acted out of business judgment and even if its actions were not
independently tortious, merely because its behavior is adjudged "improper."35
E. The Concordant Approach to Applied Normative Contract Theory
Which of these four legal rules is justified by normative contract law
theory? Such a question is exceedingly complicated because no single theory
of contracts can explain or justify all of the conflicting rules and societal
36conventions of contracts. As Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott observe,
"Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the
law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should be."3
For example, among the categories of contract theories are utilitarian
theories, which describe and advocate for contract rules that benefit society as
38
a whole, rather than the individual parties to the contract. Most prominent
among utilitarian theories are efficiency theories, which focus on enhancing the
overall wealth and utility of society's resources.39 But even among efficiency
theories there are different approaches. Traditional efficiency theory maintains
that contract law should facilitate voluntary exchanges that result in transferring
resources to where they have the highest value.40 More recent, efficiency theory
focuses on which contract rules reduce transaction costs in the allocation of
41
resources.
Another group of contract law theories are rights-based theories, which
describe and advocate for contract law rules that protect the autonomy and
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
Id.
34. See Paramount Farms Int'l, L.L.C. v. Ventilex B.V., 2016-Ohio-l 150, 61 N.E.3d 702, at¶
39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
35. See infra Section IID.
36. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 2 ("[N]o unitary theory adequately captures the entire contract-
law field.").
37. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 543.
38. SMITH, supra note 7, at 106-07.
39. Id. at 107.
40. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 214 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
10-11 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992)). Hillman refers to this approach as "'neo-classical'
law and economics." Id.
41. Id. at 214 n.9 (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance




interests of the individual parties to the contract. Even among these theorists
there is a debate as to whether contract rules should primarily protect the
sanctity of the promise,43 the reliance interest created by the contract,44 the
individual interest in the transfer of rights created by the contract,45 or all of
46these in addition to other interests depending on the contract rule in question.
Beyond these two categories of contract theory, there are many others. For
example, this brief account has not considered the dominant "bargain theory"
of the nineteenth century that grounded contract law in the exchange of
consideration.4 7 Nor does this Article consider an important theory that
emerged in the late twentieth century: Critical Legal Studies, which argues that
contract law is indeterminate, inconsistent, and subjective.48 In the guise of an
objective system of rules, contract law serves only to maintain existing power
relations and the unfair distribution of wealth to the elites in society.49
In the face of this cacophony of theories,o one is tempted to embrace the
realism of Critical Legal Theory and conclude that the choice of any particular
rule will be a grab for power clothed in the guise of a unifying theory. Doing
so does not assist in the practical task of determining which of several available
contract rules is preferable for a given situation; it is, rather, a rejection of the
possibility of objectivity for the good of the public or the protection of the
parties to a case. This insight may or may not be correct. Either way, it does
not help with the task of selecting a rule.
Another approach would be to justify one particular theory as the best
theory and then apply that theory. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that lawyers
confront a vast body of common law going back hundreds of years from many
jurisdictions.5 1 Holmes called these past decisions "the oracles of the law,"
42. SMITH, supra note 7, at 140.
43. See generally FRIED, supra note 15, at 7-27.
44. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 54.
45. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 319.
46. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
47. Barnett, supra note 7, at 287 (citing A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT 316 (1975)); see GILMORE,supra note 46, at 13-18.
48. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 462, 470 (1987).
49. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT:
ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 121 (2015); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of
Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 953-56 (1974).
50. There are other theories that have not been mentioned. For example, Hillman also discusses
contextualism and neoformalism. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 125-71. As another example, Smith
discusses additional utilitarian theories, such as promoting distributive justice, promoting valuable
relationships, or promoting autonomy. SMITH, supra note 7, at 136-39.
51. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
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because "[i]n these sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered prophecies of the
past upon the cases in which the axe will fall."52 In light of these circumstances,
Holmes felt that "[f]ar the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning
of every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies more precise,
and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system."53  But this
approach is both impossible and unsatisfactory. It is impossible because the
many rules of contract law cannot be reconciled into a thoroughly connected
system. And if we select a unitary theory to justify one rule or the other, then
we will not satisfy adherents of the host of other theories, that we have selected
the proper rule.
This is why Hanoch Dagan writes that "[t]he lure of private law monism
can and should be resisted."54 Instead of clinging stubbornly to one particular
theory, "[p]rivate law theory should take seriously the existing structural
pluralism of private law and celebrate, rather than suppress (as variations on a
common theme) or marginalize (as peripheral exceptions to a robust core), the
multiple forms typifying private law."55 In another article, Dagan applies his
structural pluralism to describe contract law as "an umbrella for diverse contract
institutions, which stand for diverse ideals of the various types of social
relationships and economic functions contracts serve."56
Robert A. Hillman also insists that "no unitary theory adequately captures
the entire contract-law field," and argues that this demonstrates the richness of
contract law rather than the cynical gathering of power to elites (as critical legal
theorists might argue).57 Hillman "emphasize[s] contract law's richness and
importance and question[s] the utility of overly abstract unitary theories."
Hillman writes that contract law largely succeeds in "suitably promot[ing] the
formation and enforcement of private arrangements and ensures some degree
of fairness in the exchange process," but not because it can be explained by a
single unifying theory.59 Rather, "contract law largely succeeds because it is
52. Id.
53. Id. at 457-58.
54. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409,
1411 (2012).
55. Id. at 1411-12 (alteration in original).
56. Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 19, 37 (2013). Erez Aloni has done important work applying structural pluralism in the area
of family law. Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 317, 317
(2016).
57. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 2.
58. Id. at xiii.
59. Id at 2.
972017]
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the product of the legal system's reasonable and practical compromises over
conflicting values and interests."60
The pluralism of scholars, such as Dagan and Hillman, is largely an attempt
to explain existing law. Can pluralism be applied in a normative way to assist
in selecting a particular rule among several options? An alternative approach
to applying one particular normative contract theory is to attempt to select the
rule that is justified by multiple contract law theories. Such an approach
recognizes the insight of pluralism, that private law is an institution that
represents a compromise between diverse interests and values in a diverse
society, and seeks to select the rule that thereby has the best chance of achieving
consensus. I call this the "concordant approach" to applied normative theory.
Elsewhere I have argued that in selecting among rules to govern patent law, one
should err on the side of selecting a rule that favors innovation and competition
over the patent monopoly, because this approach is supported by multiple
dominant patent law theories: disclosure theory, commercialization theory,
prospect theory, patent race theory, and signaling theory.62
This Article applies the concordant approach to this issue of contract law
discussed above: When should a parent company be liable in tort for interfering
with the contract of a subsidiary company? Rather than selecting between a
utilitarian approach and a rights-based approach, this Article analyzes the
question under the dominant theories from each school of thought: efficiency
theory, promissory theory, and reliance theory. Passing the various rules
through the filter of utilitarian and rights-based considerations makes sense
because, to quote Robert C. Clark, "A good society depends on both autonomy
and heteronomy, each present in large measure."63
F. Efficiency Theory Applied
Part III of this Article applies efficiency theory to the question of when a
parent company should be liable in tort for interfering with the contract of a
subsidiary company. In order to facilitate efficient breaches of contract, a
parent company should generally be privileged to direct its subsidiary to
60. Id.
61. See Dagan, supra note 54, at 1421-22.
62. Samuel F. Ernst, Protecting the Boundaries: Unclaimed Consideration in the Patentee's
Social Contract, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 12-26 (2015).
63. Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1703, 1726 (1989). Robert A. Hillman's work lends support to a concordance
approach. Hillman writes, "Contract law is complex, contradictory, and, ultimately, inconclusive on
what the relationship of these [contract theory] principles is and should be. Moreover, by ignoring or
downplaying counter-principles and theories, some theorists camouflage contract's complexity and
hence disguise its true nature." HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 7.
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terminate a contract. If the parent and subsidiary companies will profit more
from a substitute contract or from no contract at all than they would from
fulfilling the contract, then society should not punish the parent for directing
the breach of contract so long as it compensates the victim of the breach for its
expectation damages.6 4
A principal criticism of efficiency theory is that it rests on the questionable
assumption that commercial actors act rationally in the interest of the
business.65 In fact, people often act against their economic self-interest due to
a range of factors, including: social conventions and pressure, altruism,
misinformation, and risk aversion or attraction.66 Alan Schwartz and Robert E.
Scott argue that this criticism is less valid in the context of contracts between
companies, like the contracts discussed in this Article, than it is with respect to
contracts involving individuals.67 Schwartz and Scott argue that companies
generally act to maximize wealth because they are directed by shareholders,
whose principal incentive is to maximize profits.68 But even if we accept that
in the vast majority of cases parent companies will only terminate subsidiary
contracts for rational, business reasons, it makes sense to have an exception
imposing tort liability in those (perhaps rare) situations where parent companies
act irrationally out of malice or personal animus or when they commit an
independent ort (such as fraud).
Accordingly, the rule of the Category 3 cases makes the most sense from
the perspective of efficiency theory. Category 1 cases fail to punish and deter
those breaches of contract that are economically inefficient or that implicate the
promissory and reliance rights of the promisee. Category 2 cases punish and
deter all breaches of contract directed by the parent company, and thus result in
preventing many efficient breaches. Category 4 cases punish and deter many
breaches that are in the business interest of the parent and subsidiary, where the
parent company is perceived to be acting "improperly," as defined by the vague
and largely irrelevant factors set forth in the Restatement of Torts.69 Only
64. See infra Part III.
65. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
43, 52 (1993); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 307 (1984).
66. Cf Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties be Able
to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 445,
469-70 (2014) (explaining that parties do not act out of rational self-interest in settling litigation).
67. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 550.
68. Id. at 550-51.




Category 3 cases allow the parent to induce efficient breaches of contract, while
punishing the parent for irrational or independently tortious behavior.7 0
G. Rights-Based Theory Applied
Part IV of this Article argues that the category 2 approach is also justified
by rights-based promissory and reliance theories. Promissory theory protects
the freedom of individuals to enter into contracts by enforcing contractual
promises.71 But in order to protect individual autonomy, promissory theory
recognizes that contractual promises should only be respected if they are
voluntary on both sides.7 2 Accordingly, as a general proposition, promissory
theory would advocate that a parent company should not be bound by a contract
that it never entered into and that is now against the business interest of the
parent company and its newly acquired subsidiary.
Similarly, reliance theory posits that contractual promises should be
respected to protect the reliance interests of the parties to a contract.73 However,
it is only fair to force a party to respect another's reliance interest if that party
made the promise that induced reliance.74 If the parent company never made
the contractual promise that induced reliance, it is generally unfair to punish the
parent company for breaking that promise if doing so is in the business interest
of the parent company.7 ' Accordingly, both promissory and reliance theory
would support a general rule that shields a parent company from punitive tort
liability for directing the termination of a subsidiary's contract.
However, as with efficiency theory, an exception must be made for parent
companies who act out of malice or personal animus, rather than to protect the
business interests of the parent and subsidiary. If a parent company is acting in
bad faith and outside of its business interest, respect for the autonomy and
reliance of the victim of the breach requires that the parent company be
76
punished for inducing its subsidiary to breach a contract. This exception is
required by the concern of rights-based theory that parties act in good faith in
carrying out contractual obligations.
70. See infra Section II.C.
71. FRIED, supra note 15, at 16.
72. Id at 43.
73. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 56-57.
74. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 45 ("[R]cliance theorists accentuate the fairness of redressing
detrimental reliance on a promise.").
75. See id. at 218-20.
76. See FRIED, supra note 15, at 16.
77. Id. at 85.
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II. THE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER A PARENT CORPORATION CAN BE
LIABLE IN TORT FOR TORTIOUSLY INTERFERING WITH THE CONTRACT OF A
SUBSIDIARY
A. Category 1: Decisions Formalistically Rejecting Tort Liability (Georgia,
Michigan, and the Texas Split)
When a company acquires a subsidiary, it inherits employees, product lines,
facilities, and it also inherits contracts between the subsidiary company and
third parties. In reorganizing the subsidiary company to meet its business
interests, the parent company may direct the termination of one or more of the
subsidiary's contracts. Whether this is treated as tortious interference with
contract would rationally depend on the particular circumstances. Did the
parent direct he termination for rational reasons to protect the business interest
of its shareholders? For example, because an existing requirements contract
can now be replaced by the parent supplying the goods or because the parent
can negotiate a better contract for the subsidiary with someone else? Did the
parent company terminate the contract in question to squelch competition from
the victim of the breach? (Also a legitimate business interest so long as it does
not run afoul of the antitrust laws.) Or did the parent direct the termination of
the contract even though it might harm the business interests of the subsidiary
or parent, out of personal animus or spite or as part of a scheme to commit
fraud?
Unfortunately, whether the parent's act is punished as a tort depends less
on these particular circumstances than it does on which body of law happens to
govern the dispute. Some companies find themselves in jurisdictions that
formalistically reject any tort liability for a parent that terminates the contract
of a subsidiary.7 8 These Category 1 cases reason that because the parent and
subsidiary share a unity of interest, the parent is no stranger to the contract and
can therefore orchestrate its breach without incurring punitive damages.79
In Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., the plaintiff
Servo Kinetics (SKI) had a contract with Tokyo Precision Instruments (TSS)
under which SKI had been distributing TSS electrical valves for over ten years
in the North American market.80 This relationship ended when Moog, Inc.
78. See Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2007);
Cleveland Reg'1 Med. Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App. 2010); H.S.M.
Acquisitions, Inc. v. West, 917 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App. 1996); Am. Med. Int'l, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821
SW.2d 331 (Tex. App. 1991).
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
80. 475 F.3d at 787.
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acquired a controlling interest in TSS in 2002.8 Roughly ten days after Moog
acquired TSS, TSS sent a letter to SKI providing notice that it was terminating
the agreement.82 SKI brought claims against TSS and its parent, Moog, for
breach of contract and also a claim against Moog for tortious interference with
contract.83
In analyzing the breach of contract claims, the Sixth Circuit, applying
Japanese law, necessarily had to consider whether the contract was breached
for a "commercially legitimate motive" because the contract stated that the
contract could not be terminated "without good reason."84 The court concluded
that there was a dispute of fact as to whether the contract was terminated for the
legitimately commercial reason that TSS was in poor financial condition or for
the perhaps illegitimate motive that Moog did not want SKI to compete with
85
Moog in selling valves to the same customers. The court further concluded
that there was a dispute of fact under Michigan law as to whether TSS was a
"mere instrumentality" of Moog to justify piercing the corporate veil and
allowing Moog to be liable for any breach of contract by TSS.86 Hence, the
breach of contract claims were remanded for trial to determine if TSS and its
parent Moog would be liable for compensatory contract damages.87
The Sixth Circuit's treatment of the tortious interference claim was quite
different. Applying Michigan law, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
the claim on summary judgment because "SKI cannot demonstrate that Moog
was a third party to the TSS-SKI contract."8 8 The court held that under
Michigan law, tortious interference with contract requires "(1) a contract; (2) a
breach; and (3) instigation of the breach without justification by the
defendant."89 However, the claim could be disposed of without analyzing these
elements because Michigan law also provides that "tortious interference with
contract requires proof . . . that the defendant was a 'third-party' to the
contractual relationship."90 The court concluded as a matter of law that there
was a "unity of the parties" because Moog completely controlled TSS.91
81. Id. at 788.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 789.
84. Id at 790-91.
85. Id. at 793.
86. Id at 799.
87. Id. at 802.
88. Id. at 800-01.
89. Id. at 800.
90. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Willis v. New World Van Lines, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d
380, 396 (E.D. Mich. 2000)).
91. Id at 801.
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"[T]here was functionally only one corporation, Moog, which could not induce
a breach in what was in effect its own contract."92  Hence, Moog could
terminate the contract for any reason and under any motivation, just as though
it were a party to the contract. In disposing of the tortious interference claim,
the court had no need to consider the factual disputes regarding Moog's and
TSS's motivations that were relevant to whether there was a breach of
contract.93 Because the parent corporation's "interests are unified with the
interests of the controlled corporation," there could be no tortious interference
with contract and resultant punitive damages under any circumstances.94
Georgia apparently has the same black-letter approach as Michigan to this
question. In Lyman v. Cellchem, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that
"[t]his Court in the past contemplated that, under some circumstances, a parent
corporation might be a stranger to its subsidiary's business relations such that
a claim against the parent for tortious interference could lie." 95 The court
decided that the Georgia Supreme Court had subsequently "disapproved" of
this approach by stating in a different context hat "all parties to an interwoven
contractual arrangement [or business relationship] are not liable for tortious
interference with any of the contracts or business relationships."96 Although
the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the particular situation of a parent
terminating the contract of a subsidiary, the Court of Appeals extended the
Supreme Court's reasoning to that situation, holding "that as a matter of law, a
parent corporation cannot be a stranger to its subsidiaries' business or
contractual relations, and that no claim can be sustained against a parent for
tortious interference with such relations."97 Applying this bright-line approach,
the court threw out a jury verdict holding a subsidiary liable for tortiously
interfering with the contract of its parent corporation.98 The court made plain
that the subsidiary's motives in interfering with the contract were irrelevant.99
Even though it was "clear that Appellants were not blameless in their
machinations involving Cellchem," and even though the subsidiary's action
constituted a breach of its fiduciary duties, there could be no claim for tortious
92. Id.
93. Id. at 800-01.
94. Id.
95. 779 S.E.2d 474, 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (citing SunAmerica Fin., Inc. v. 260 Peachtree St.,
Inc., 415 S.E.2d 677, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)).
96. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278,
283-84 (Ga. 1998)).
97. Id. (quoting In re Hercules Auto. Prod., Inc., 245 B.R. 903, 910 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999)).
98. Id. at 48 1.
99. Id. at 479.
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interference with contract because the subsidiary was no stranger to the contract
as a matter of law.100
In Texas, there is a split of authority. Some divisions of the Texas Court of
Appeals have adopted this absolute immunity approach, while one opinion has
adopted the Category 3 approach described below.101 An example of a Texas
Category 1 case is American Medical International, Inc. v. Giurintano.102 In
American Medical International, the plaintiff was a hospital administrator who
alleged, inter alia, that the parent company of the hospital where he was
employed tortiously interfered with his employment contract.'03 The Texas
Court of Appeals held that this claim should have been dismissed on the
pleadings because a parent and subsidiary corporation "are so closely aligned
that it is impossible, as a matter of law, for one to tortiously interfere with the
other." 104 Hence, although the defendants' behavior was sufficiently tortious
to uphold a jury verdict of intentional infliction of emotional distress, there
could be no liability for tortious interference with contract simply because of
the parent-subsidiary relationship.0 5 Other Texas cases apply the same blanket
rule.106
In applying this absolute rule, the Texas cases rely heavily on the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.0 7
In Copperweld, the Court decided that subsidiary and parent corporations are
incapable of conspiring with one another to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act
100. Id.
101. See Justin E. Myers, Comment, Sneaking Around the Corporate Veil: Tattooing a Parent
Corporation with Liability for Tortious Interference with its Subsidiary's Contract, 35 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 193, 195 (2004) ("In Texas, two schools of thought that argue whether a parent corporation can
be held liable for tortious interference with its subsidiary's contractual relations have emerged from
the courts. Some courts have indicated that a blanket ban exists on a parent corporation's liability for
tortious interference with its subsidiary's contractual relations. Other courts have left open the
possibility of a parent corporation's liability for tortious interference with its subsidiary's contractual
relations."); see also infra Section II.C (discussing Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. McLane Co.,
945 S.W.2d 160, 168 (Tex. App. 1997)).
102. See 821 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App. 1991).
103. Id. at 335.
104. Id. at 336-37.
105. Id. at 344.
106. See, e.g., Cleveland Reg'1 Med. Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322, 346 (Tex.
App. 2010) ("[B]y nature a parent company has a complete identity of financial interest with its wholly
owned subsidiary and, therefore, as a matter of law cannot tortiously interfere with the contract of its
wholly owned subsidiary."); H.S.M. Acquisitions, Inc. v. West, 917 S.W.2d 872, 883 (Tex. App. 1996)
("Keystone-PA had been a wholly owned subsidiary of Chester since September 1988. As such,
Chester could not have tortiously interfered with Keystonc-PA as a matter of law.").
107. 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (discussed in Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 336; Cleveland Reg'1
Med. Ctr., L.P., 323 S.W.3d at 347; H.S.M Acquisitions, Inc., 917 S.W.2d at 882).
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because they have a unity of interest.108 In this context, the Supreme Court
reasoned as follows:
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate;
their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by
two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not
unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the
control of a single driver. With or without a formal
"agreement," the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent,
its sole shareholder.1 09
This reasoning makes sense in the context of determining whether there is
conspiracy liability under the Sherman Act. The parent-subsidiary relationship
precludes free-market competition between the two companies and their actions
cannot, therefore, be expected to comply with antitrust policy to preserve
competition.1 10 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[i]f a parent
and a wholly owned subsidiary do 'agree' to a course of action, there is no
sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different
interests."1 1
The Supreme Court's reasoning does not, however, apply to the question of
whether a parent can commit a tort against a third party by directing its
subsidiary to breach a contract with that third party. That question involves
contract and tort law policy, not competition policy. Despite a parent
company's unity of interest with its subsidiary company, the parent may well
act tortiously against a third party in a way that does not protect the business
interests of the parent and subsidiary, even if such behavior would not
necessarily implicate competition policy.112 Accordingly, the Copperweld
decision is not controlling or even particularly persuasive authority with respect
to the issue at hand.
B. Category 2: Decisions Formalistically Imposing Tort Liability Because
the Parent and Subsidiary are Technically Separate Entities (The Minority
Rule)
The rule of Category 2-that the parent enjoys no immunity from tort
liability for terminating the contract of a subsidiary-may exist only in theory,
or perhaps only in Florida.
108. Id. at 771.
109. Id
110. Id. at 770-71.
111. Id. at771.
112. See infra Section I.C.
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In Oxford Furniture Companies v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit, applying Alabama law, affirmed a jury verdict against Masco
Corporation for its alleged tortious interference with the contract of its wholly
owned subsidiary, Drexel.' 13 Drexel had a contract with the plaintiff, Oxford
Furniture Companies, whereby Oxford was the exclusive dealer of Drexel's
furniture. 114 When another furniture distributor, McLeod, became upset about
the exclusive nature of the Oxford contract and threatened litigation, Masco
advised its subsidiary Drexel that it should continue to distribute through
McLeod, a decision that Oxford considered a breach of contract.'15 The trial
court found Masco liable for tortious interference with contract and awarded
Oxford $250,000 in punitive damages on that claim.116
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit rejected Masco's claim that it was immune
from tort liability because Drexel was its wholly owned subsidiary."7 The court
acknowledged that under Alabama law, "the alleged tortfeasor 'must be
independent of, or a third party to,' the contract at issue."' 18 However,
"Alabama law also recognizes that a parent corporation is a distinct entity from
its subsidiary and that the parent is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless
the subsidiary is 'a mere adjunct, instrumentality, or alter ego of the parent
corporation."'1 19 Because of this technical distinction between the two entities,
and because there was no evidence that Masco was a party to the contract,
Masco could be liable for tortious interference with contract and the jury verdict
was affirmed.12 0 The court did not inquire into Masco's purpose in interfering
with the contract, whether it acted out of legitimate business interest, or whether
its conduct constituted an independent tort. Rather, the technical separation
between the parent and the subsidiary meant that the parent was a stranger to
the contract and was therefore liable in tort for advising its subsidiary to breach
the contract.
In Peacock v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the defendant was
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), General Motor's wholly
owned subsidiary responsible for financing GM cars.12 1 When the plaintiffs'
Chevy car dealership went bankrupt, they sued GMAC for tortious interference
with the contract between the plaintiffs and GM by virtue of GMAC attempting
113. 984 F.2d 1118, 1126 (llth Cir. 1993).
114. Id. at 1121.
115. Id. at 1121-22.
116. Id. at 1122.
117. Id. at 1126.
118. Id. (quoting Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1387-88 (Ala. 1986)).
119. Id. (quoting Exparte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Ala. 1983)).
120. Id.
121. 432 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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to reclaim and obtain payment for vehicles the plaintiffs had purchased from
GM.122 The Florida District Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs could proceed
with their claim, despite the fact that GMAC was nothing more than the wholly
owned financing arm of GM. 123 The court's reasoning consisted largely of the
observation that "GMAC is a distinct legal entity, and its being a wholly owned
subsidiary of GM does not alter that status."l24 The court rejected GMAC's
argument that it was privileged to act as it did because it was protecting its
contractual rights and business interests. 125 "GMAC's privilege to protect its
contractual interests is not absolute but is instead conditioned upon its
employing means that are not improper."1 2 6 Accordingly, even if GMAC could
prove it was acting to protect legitimate business interests, it could still be held
liable in tort for interfering with the contract of its parent company.
The rule of Category 2 is plainly a minority rule, with only these two cases
applying Alabama and Florida law in adopting this approach. It is a highly
formalistic approach that considers only the technical separation between the
parent and subsidiary corporation, but fails to consider whether the two entities
share a unity of interests and whether they are acting to advance their legitimate
business interests. As I argue below, this formalistic approach lacks
justification in either efficiency or rights-based theories of contract law. 127
C. Category 3: Decisions Imposing Tort Liability only if the Parent Fails to
Act in the Best Interests of the Parent and Subsidiary or Commits an
Independent Tort (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin,
and the Texas Split)
The plurality approach to this issue adopts a middle ground. Category 3
cases hold that a parent company is privileged to terminate the contract of a
subsidiary if it is acting out of a legitimate business interest and does not
commit an independent tort. 128 In theory, this approach shields efficient




125. Id. at 143-44.
126. Id. at 144.
127. See infra Parts III, IV.
128. See Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1988); Phil Crowley Steel Corp.
v. Sharon Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1986); Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. McLane




In WMW Machinery Co. v. Koerber A G, the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing the
claim for tortious interference brought by WMW Machinery Company
(WMW) against K.A.K. Holding Co. (KAK).1 2 9 WMW claimed that KAK
tortiously interfered with contracts it had with three KAK subsidiary companies
to act as the exclusive distributor of defendants' grinding equipment.130 The
Appellate Division held that the tortious interference claim was properly
dismissed because "the parent or a subsidiary of the Manufacturers, have an
economic interest in the Manufacturers sufficient to support a defense of
economic justification."l 3 1 The court held that the defendants had a legitimate
business justification for terminating the contracts, "especially in light of
WMW's failure to sell a single machine pursuant to the contracts for over 22
months."l3 2 The court stated that "[t]he imposition of liability in spite of a
defense of economic interest requires a showing of either malice on the one
hand, or fraudulent or illegal means on the other." 33 The tortious interference
claim was properly dismissed because WMW "failed to raise a triable issue of
fact as to whether the defendants were motivated by malice, or employed
fraudulent or illegal means to terminate the contracts." 34
The Second Circuit applied this New York rule to reverse a jury verdict of
tortious interference with contract against Volvo for winding down the
corporate affairs of its subsidiary, Beijer, Inc., in a way which resulted in the
termination of Beijer's contract with the plaintiff, American Protein
Corporation (American Protein). 135 The court held that under New York law,
"terminating a corporate contract in furtherance of an equally important right
to act in its own economic interests justifies what would otherwise be
actionable." 36 The court held that the jury verdict against Volvo and its
executives failed "as a matter of law," because "[t]here is no evidence on the
record before us of malice toward American Protein." 37 Rather, "the evidence
showed only that Volvo executives on the board of Beijer, Inc. endorsed





134. Id. See Koret, Inc. v. Christian Dior, S.A., 554 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
("Dior-Paris, as the corporate parent, had a right to interfere with the contract of its subsidiary, in order
to protect its economic interests.").
135. Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1988).




terminating Beijer, Inc.'s contract with plaintiff for the legitimate business
reason that it was losing money."l3 8
In short, the Category 3 cases envision a dichotomy whereby the parent's
decision to terminate a subsidiary contract might be motivated by legitimate
business reasons or by an illegitimate, irrational reason such as "malice." If the
parent's actions are motivated by legitimate business reasons, then there is no
tort liability unless the actions constitute an independent tort.1 39
The Texas courts are split on whether to apply this rule or the absolute
immunity rule of Category 1.140 In Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C. V v.
McLane Co., the San Antonio Division of the Texas Court of Appeals adopted
the Category 3 rule, deciding "that a parent's interference with its subsidiary's
contractual relations is usually justified, [but] circumstances may arise in which
the financial interests of neither [the parent nor the subsidiary] motivate the
interference."1 41 The court acknowledged that in adopting this rule, it was
"declin[ing] to follow our sister courts."1 42 Rather than adopting a rule of
absolute immunity, the court held that "a parent corporation is privileged to
interfere with its subsidiary's contractual relations 'when the contract threatens
a present economic interest of its wholly owned subsidiary,' and the parent does
not 'employ[] wrongful means or act[] with an improper purpose."'1 4 3 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Texas law to arrive at the same
conclusion, holding that a plaintiff in this situation "cannot recover for tortious
interference with contract or with business relations if the allegedly interfering
third party acted to protect his own legitimate interest."1"
The Category 3 test does not always immunize a parent from tort liability
for terminating the contract of a subsidiary. In Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v.
Sharon Steel Corp., the Eighth Circuit applied Missouri law to affirm a jury
verdict finding that NFV Company and Sharon Steel tortiously interfered with
the contracts between their subsidiary company and the plaintiff, Phil Crowley
Steel Corporation.145 The court found that the parent companies were liable
138. Id.
139. Examples of potential independent torts include "threats, violence, trespass, defamation,
misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or the
common law." Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 428 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying
Missouri law).
140. See supra Section II.A (discussing Texas cases applying the rule of Category 1).
141. 945 S.W.2d 160, 168 (Tex. App. 1997).
142. Id.; see supra Section II.A.
143. Valores Corporativos, 945 S.W.2d at 168 (alteration in original) (quoting T.P. Leasing
Corp. v. Baker Leasing Corp., 732 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ark. 1987)).
144. Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir. 1985).
145. 782 F.2d 781, 782 (8th Cir. 1986).
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because they "did not act to protect an interest of NVF or Sharon that the
Macomber-Crowley contracts potentially threatened."46 Rather, the parents
acted contrary to their interests in the subsidiary in order to assist another
subsidiary company, Ohio Metal.14 7  Tort liability was appropriate in this
situation because "Macomber's contracts did not threaten any interests of NVF
and Sharon such as to justify their interference."48 Where a parent company
does act in its legitimate commercial interest, however, Missouri law will shield
it from tort liability for intentional interference with contract.149
The Rule of Category 3 has been adopted by a plurality of states that have
confronted this issue. In addition to New York, Texas, and Missouri, the rule
has been adopted by courts applying the laws of Alaska,15 0 Arkansas,'5 '
146. Id. at 784.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 428 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying
Missouri law). The parent corporation had "a legitimate economic interest" in terminating contracts
of its subsidiary and did not employ "independently wrongful [means], such as threats, violence,
trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized
by statute or the common law," therefore, the parent was not liable for tortious interference with
contract. Id.
150. Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980). The Supreme Court of Alaska held
that a parent was not liable for tortious interference with the contract of a subsidiary under the rule that
"where there is a direct financial interest in a contract, the essential question in determining if
interference is justified is whether the person's conduct is motivated by a desire to protect his economic
interest, or whether it is motivated by spite, malice, or some other improper objective." Id. at 31.
151. T.P. Leasing Corp. v. Baker Leasing Corp., 732 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ark. 1987) ("We think
the correct rule is that a parent corporation's privilege permits it to interfere with another's contractual
relations when the contract threatens a present economic interest of its wholly owned subsidiary, absent
clear evidence that the parent employed wrongful means or acted with an improper purpose.").
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Connecticut,152  Delaware," Illinois,1 54  Maryland,1 5 5  North Carolina,156
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington,159 and Wisconsin.160 As I argue
152. Boulevard Assocs. v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 72 F.3d 1029, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] parent
company does not engage in tortious conduct when it directs its wholly-owned subsidiary to breach a
contract that is no longer in the subsidiary's economic interest to perform.").
153. Wallace ex rel. Ccncom v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("As for the
Affiliates and Parents, 'there can be no non-contractual liability to the affiliated corporation' for
tortious interference unless plaintiffs plead and prove that: (1) the Affiliates and Parents were
'interfering part[ics],' and (2) the Affiliates and Parents interfered 'not to achieve permissible financial
goals but sought maliciously or in bad faith to injure plaintiffs."') (alteration in original) (quoting
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 591 (Del. Ch. 1994)).
154. Knickman v. Midland Risk Servs.-Ill., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 458, 462-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(holding that parent company was not liable for tortiously interfering with a subsidiary's contract where
the parent acted to protect its interests in the subsidiary); Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 366 N.E.2d
561, 571 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that parent company was not liable for inducing the breach of a
subsidiary contract because the parent's action "was motivated by reasonable business purposes and
was the product of neither malice nor bad faith").
155. Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 650 A.2d 260, 272 (Md.
1994) ("A parent corporation is generally justified in requiring its subsidiary to modify economic
arrangements, contractual or otherwise, if those arrangements do not benefit the parent.").
156. Broussard v. Meincke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998). The Fourth
Circuit applying North Carolina law held that the parent company of a franchisor was immune from
tort liability for directing the termination of franchise agreements because "parties having an interest
in the activities of a corporation or the duty to advise or direct such activities should be immune from
liability for inducing the corporation to breach its contract, assuming their actions are in pursuit of such
interests or duties." Id. at 351.
157. Green v. Interstate United Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 748 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying
Pennsylvania law to hold that a parent company was privileged to interfere with the contract of a
subsidiary for the proper purpose of preventing the dissipation of corporate resources); Shared
Commc'ns Servs. of 1800-80 JFK Boulevard, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Props., Inc., 692 A.2d 570, 575 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that parent companies could be liable for tortious interference with contract
where they were "not acting to protect a 'legitimate concern"'). But see Nat'l Data Payment Sys. v.
Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 857 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he exact scope of the corporate parent privilege
is unclear, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue.").
158. Waste Conversion Sys., Inc. v. Greenstone Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 2000)
("A parent corporation acting contrary to its wholly-owned subsidiary's economic interests can be
considered a third party to its subsidiary's contractual relationship and can be held liable for tortiously
interfering with that relationship."). The Supreme Court of Tennessee has further held that the
qualified privileged to interfere with the contract of a subsidiary does not apply when the parent owns
less than 100% of the subsidiary. Cambio Health Sols., L.L.C. v. Reardon, 213 S.W.3d 785, 792 (Tenn.
2006).
159. Hansen v. Transworld Wireless TV-Spokane, Inc., 44 P.3d 929, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(asserting that parent companies were not liable for tortious interference where they were acting to
maximize shareholder value).
160. Allen & O'Hara, Inc. v. Barrett Wrecking, Inc., 898 F.2d 512, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1990)
(asserting that parent company was not liable for tortious interference with the contract of a subsidiary
where it acted to protect its business interests).
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below, this plurality approach is justified by both efficiency theory and rights-
based theories.161
D. Category 4: Decisions Imposing Tort Liability for "Improper" Behavior
In California, "the privilege of a parent or subsidiary corporation to
interfere with the contractual relationship of the other 'is at most a qualified one
dependent for its existence upon the circumstances of the case."'l62 California
provides little protection from tort liability to a parent seeking to terminate the
contract of a subsidiary because it does not treat the parent-subsidiary
relationship as a special circumstance in analyzing tortious interference
claims.163 Rather, California follows the Restatement of Torts sections
applicable to all defendants to analyze this issue.'" Parent corporations have
the burden of pleading and proving as an affirmative defense that they are
privileged to interfere with the contract of a subsidiary.165
To meet this burden, a parent corporation must prove that it: "(a) does not
employ improper means, and (b) acts to protect his interest from being
prejudiced by the relation."l6 6 This test is derived from Section 769 of the
Restatement of Torts, which provides that one who has a financial interest in
the business of a third person does not intentionally interfere with prospective
business relations if he "does not employ improper means" and "acts to protect
his interest from being prejudiced." 67 To determine what constitutes improper
means, Section 769 points to "[t]he predatory means discussed in [Section]
767."l68 Section 767 is a generally applicable section that provides the
161. See infra Parts III, IV.
162. GHK Assocs. v. Mayer Group, 274 Cal. Rptr. 168, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added) (quoting Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vomado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421-422 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972)).
163. Id. at 184-85.
164. Culcal Stylco, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. at 421 & n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
165. GHKAssocs., 274 Cal. Rptr. at 185. This is in contradistinction to Category 3 cases, which
put the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the parent company acted against its economic interest or
committed an independent ort. See, e.g., Wallace ex rel. Ccncom v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Del.
Ch. 1999) ("As for the Affiliates and Parents, 'there can be no non-contractual liability to the affiliated
corporation' for tortious interference unless plaintiffs plead and prove that: (1) the Affiliates and
Parents were 'interfering part[ies],' and (2) the Affiliates and Parents interfered 'not to achieve
permissible financial goals but sought maliciously or in bad faith to injure plaintiffs."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 591 (Del. Ch. 1994))).
166. Asahi Kasci Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(quoting Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
168. Id. § 769 cmt. c.
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following seven non-exclusive factors for the court to consider in determining
whether a party acted improperly in intentionally interfering with a contract:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of
the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.169
Only one of these factors takes into account the parent-subsidiary
relationship (factor (g)), and Category 4 courts caution that "[t]his factor is but
one of the several factors contained within Section 767."l70
It is erroneous for California courts to follow these generally applicable
sections in analyzing the specific situation of a parent's intentional interference
with contract. Section 769 applies to persons who have "an interest in the
nature of an investment" in the business, such as "[a] part owner of the
business" or "a partner or stockholder."171  And Section 767 applies to
defendants accused of this tort generally.172 Sections 767 and 769 simply do
not speak to the special circumstance of the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary
seeking to terminate the contract of a subsidiary.173
This was the conclusion of the Alaska Supreme Court in holding that it was
error for the trial court to instruct the jury based on these Restatement Sections
in a case involving a parent corporation's decision to terminate the contract of
a subsidiary.174  The Alaska Supreme Court first stated that Section 769
unambiguously does not apply to claims of tortious interference with an
existing contract.175 The court then went on to observe that "the comments and
bulk of cases citing § 767 deal with torts by competitors and are of little help
here." 76 This is because
169. Id. § 769 (1979).
170. Paramount Farms Int'l, L.L.C. v. Ventilex B.V., 2016-Ohio-I 150, 61 N.E.3d 702, at 1 39
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
172. See id § 767.
173. See id. §§ 767, 769.
174. Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24, 30 (Alaska 1980).
175. Id. at 29-30.
176. Id. at 30.
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[t]here appears to be a significant distinction, however,
between the interests of a person in his competitor's contracts
and those contracts in which he has some direct financial
interest. One who interferes with a competitor's contracts
ordinarily has little to lose and much to gain by successfully
causing a breach of contract. Encouraging contractual stability
may require imposing legal liability to stop such behavior
when it steps beyond limits acceptable to society. But in a case
where a person has some direct financial stake in a contract, it
appears logical that a person's own economic self-interest
would discourage causing a breach of contract because there
would be some personal loss. 17 7
Accordingly, the plurality of jurisdictions follow the Category 3 rule, and
hold that a parent is privileged to terminate the contract of a subsidiary without
incurring punitive liability if it acts in its economic interest and does not commit
an independent ort.178
The rule of Category 4 strays from these principles by imposing tort liability
even in circumstances where a parent acts out of sound business judgment, if
its actions are deemed to be "improper." 79 Because the definition of improper
depends on the vague, multi-factored test of Section 767 of the Restatement,
liability can be based on something less than tortious behavior. so Category 3
cases impose tort liability on a parent acting in its business interest only if it
commits an independent tort, "such as 'misrepresentations of facts, threats,
violence, defamation, trespass, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act
recognized by statute or common law.""' Category 4 cases allow for punitive
remedies against a parent acting in the business interest of the parent and
subsidiary if the courts deem its actions merely "improper."
A stark example of Category 4 in action is the case of Asahi Kasei Pharma
Corp. v. Actelion Ltd.182 Actelion was a pharmaceutical company that acquired
all of the stock in CoTherix, another pharmaceutical company.183 CoTherix had
an existing joint-development contract with the plaintiff, Asahi, to develop a
pharmaceutical called Fasudil that would directly compete with Actelion's
177. Id.
178. See supra Section II.C.
179. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
181. Waste Conversion Sys., Inc. v. Greenstone Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tenn. 2000).
182. 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
183. Id. at 693.
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existing pharmaceutical product, Tracleer.'84  On the day that Actelion's
acquisition of CoTherix was finalized, it notified Asahi "that it was
discontinuing development of Fasudil for 'business and commercial
reasons."'"8 5 Asahi sued Actelion and its directors for intentional interference
with contract and prospective economic advantage and obtained a jury verdict
for over $500 million dollars in compensatory damages plus punitive damages
against the directors of Actelion.' 86  These damages did not include
compensatory damages for simple breach of contract because breach of contract
damages had already been awarded to Asahi in an international arbitration.187
Rather, the remedies awarded to Asahi were to deter and remedy the torts of
intentional interference with contract and prospective economic advantage.
88
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against Actelion and its
directors. 189
Actelion was liable in tort despite the fact that it acted for the indisputable
business benefit of stopping a joint development relationship to develop
plaintiffs drug that was in direct competition with Actelion and its newly
acquired subsidiary.'90 The evidence at trial showed that Actelion terminated
its newly acquired subsidiary's contract "because it saw Fasudil as a significant
threat to its market dominance with Tracleer."l91 Accordingly, under the rule
of Category 4, Actelion was liable in tort because it employed improper means
in terminating the contract. The evidence of improper means did not amount
to monopolization or other anticompetitive behavior in violation of the antitrust
laws, and no causes of action were tried to the jury for an independent ort based
on the decision to breach the contract.'92 Rather, it appears the Court of Appeal
found evidence of improper means to support the jury verdict in the fact that
Actelion refused to provide Asahi with assurance that the joint development
agreement would continue in the period of time between the announcement of
Actelion's acquisition of CoTherix and the final consummation of the
merger.' Nor did Actelion inform Asahi during this period that it had already
decided to terminate the agreement.194 Accordingly, what would otherwise be
184. Id at 694-95.
185. Id. at 696.
186. Id. at 693.
187. Id at 697.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 714.
190. Id. at 701-05.
191. Id. at 695.
192. Id. at 700-01.




a simple breach of contract sounded in tort simply because Actelion declined
to announce the breach of contract until after the acquisition of CoTherix was
finalized.
Undoubtedly there would have been no tort liability in Asahi if the case had
been tried in a Category 3 jurisdiction. The decision by Actelion to terminate
the contract was made for the sound business reason that Actelion did not want
its wholly owned subsidiary engaged in a project with a competitor to develop
a drug in direct competition with Actelion. 19 Nor did Asahi attempt to prove
at trial that Actelion's action constituted an independent tort or an antitrust
violation.196 Asahi is a case where a simple breach of contract, that had already
been compensated in arbitration, was penalized with over $500 million in
additional damages. This is the difference between Category 3 and Category
4.
It appears that the rule of Category 4 may be followed in two other states.
In Paramount Farms International v. Ventilex, B. V, the Ohio Court of Appeals
held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing the
plaintiff s claim that a parent company intentionally interfered with the contract
of a subsidiary without considering the multi-factored test set forth in Section
767 of the Restatement of Torts.19 7 However, this decision is not reported in
any official reporter, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Ohio
law would shield a parent company from tort liability where it acted to protect
a legitimate commercial interest rather than out of malice.198
In Hawk Enterprises, Inc. v. Cash America International, Inc., the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals similarly held that the trial court could not
grant summary judgment dismissing such a claim without considering the seven
factors set forth in Section 767 of the Restatement.199 In doing so, however, the
court explicitly recognized that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not
addressed the issue.2 00
195. Id. at 693.
196. Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689.
197. 2016-Ohio-1150, 61 N.E.3d 702, at 139 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767
(AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
198. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharm., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601-02 (6th Cir. 1988).
199. 282 P.3d 786, 792-95 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
200. Id. at 792.
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III. APPLYING EFFICIENCY THEORY, TORT LIABILITY SHOULD BE INCURRED
IF THE PARENT CORPORATION FAILS TO ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY OR COMMITS AN INDEPENDENT TORT
Efficiency theory generally addresses problems in contract law by asking
which solution increases overall social welfare by resulting in the most efficient
use of resources and an increase in societal wealth and utility. 201 "[E]fficiency,"
Judge Posner writes, "denote[s] that allocation of resources in which value is
maximized.2 0 2
According to efficiency theory, contract rules should be selected that are
efficient in one of two ways.203 A rule (or transaction) is Pareto-superior if it
makes at least one person better off and no person worse off.204 For example,
a breach of contract is Pareto-efficient if it makes the breaching party better off
and the non-breaching party is given whatever gain it expected to achieve if the
contract had been performed. Stephen Smith writes that "[tlo determine if a
rule is Pareto-efficient, it is sufficient to ask if everyone did, or would, agree to
it.,,205
But because transactions and rules have effects on third parties as well,
there is a more complicated conception of efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency.206 A rule or transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if its overall
benefits outweigh its costs-"if the gains made by those who benefit from the
rule are greater than the losses incurred by anyone who might be harmed by the
rule." 207 Smith opines that "Pareto-efficiency is favoured as a standard by many
economists since it does not require the complex (some would say impossible)
interpersonal comparisons of welfare required to assess Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency." 208
201. SMITH, supra note 7, at 107.
202. POSNER, supra note 10, at 16.
203. SMITH, supra note 7, at 110.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 111.
206. POSNER, supra note 10, at 17.
207. SMITH, supra note 7, at 110.
208. Id. at 110-11 (alteration in original). For an additional explanation of Pareto-cfficiency and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512-20 (1980).
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The most well-known insight of efficiency theory is the concept of the
efficient breach of contract.209 Sometimes it is more economical for a party to
breach a contract than to complete performance, even if we take into account
the compensatory damages the breaching party must pay to the non-breaching
210
party. Posner provides a clear example of this situation:
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground
widgets at 100 apiece to A for use in his boiler factory. After
I have delivered 10,000, B comes to me, explains that he
desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground widgets at once since
otherwise he will be forced to close his pianola factory at great
cost, and offers me 150 apiece for them. I sell him the widgets
and as a result do not complete timely delivery to A, causing
him to lose $1,000 in profits. Having obtained an additional
profit of $1,250 on the sale to B, I am better off even after
reimbursing A for his loss, and B is also better off. The breach
211is therefore Pareto superior.
The reason why the breach is Pareto superior is that the breaching party has
gained $250 more than it would have gained by performing the original contract
and A, the non-breaching party, is no worse off because it has been paid its
expectation of $1,000 in profits. Indeed, the breach may be Kaldor-Hicks
efficient because in addition to the $250 of additional profit earned by the
breaching party, B has obtained 25,000 widgets that it places a higher value on
than A did, the pianola factory remains open, providing jobs to all of its
employees and economic activity to society, and the widgets go to the place of
their highest utility and value. If we assume that the parties to contracts act
rationally to maximize wealth or avoid loss, then most breaches of contract are
likely efficient-done either because performance will result in a loss or less of
212a gain than an alternative contract or no contract at all.
The necessary consequence of recognizing that many or most breaches of
contract are efficient is a conclusion that contract law should not impose
remedies that punish or deter a breach of contract. In the words of Robert L.
Birmingham, "protection of the expectation interest is . . . dictated by
considerations of economic efficiency, since it encourages optimal reallocation
of factors of production and goods without causing material instability of
209. See generally POSNER, supra note 10; SMITH, supra note 7; Birmingham, supra note 9.
210. POSNER, supra note 10, at 151; see SMITH, supra note 7, at 117.
211. POSNER, supra note 10, at 151.
212. Id. at 149 ("Most breaches of contract, however, are not opportunistic. Many are
involuntary; performance is impossible at a reasonable cost-maybe at any cost.. . . Other breaches
are voluntary but, as we are about to see, efficient-which from an economic standpoint is the same
case as that of an involuntary breach.").
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,,213expectations". On the other hand, if parties were punished for a breach of
contract with supra-compensatory, punitive damages, parties would be forced
to perform contracts even where performance results in a loss or less profit for
the breaching party, delivery of the goods or services to a party that values them
less than another party, and less wealth-maximization and economic activity in
society as a whole. To return to the hypothetical described above, if the
breaching party were forced to perform the original contract with A, A would
be in the same position as it would had the contract been breached, but the
breaching party would be $250 poorer, B would lose 25,000 desperately needed
widgets, and the pianola factory would be shuttered, and all of its employees
would lose their jobs. Moreover, the law would bend the widgets to a use
valued at 100 apiece rather than a use valued at 150 apiece resulting in a sub-
optimal utility for those widgets. According to efficiency theory, it is to avoid
deterring efficient breaches of contract that the standard remedy is expectation
damages, and not punitive damages.2 14
Now to return to the situation of a parent company directing its subsidiary
to breach a contract: should the law punish the parent for inducing these
breaches of contract? At first blush, the answer would appear to be no, never.
Just as efficiency theory assumes that a simple breach of contract is committed
for rational reasons to maximize wealth,2 15 so too must a parent company's
inducement of breach be presumed to be motivated by a desire to maximize
wealth. If a parent company induces a breach of contract, it will be because
performance by the subsidiary of the contract will result in less gain or more
loss than breaching the contract would, even after taking into account the need
to compensate the non-breaching party for its expectation damages.
Accordingly, Category 1, complete immunity from tort liability for the parent
company, would appear to be the approach favored by efficiency theory.
However, if we are to apply a truly concordant approach, then we must take
into account the valid critiques of efficiency theory before selecting a rule. One
principle critique of efficiency theory is that it is based on the false assumption
that the breaching party always acts out of rational, self-interest.2 16 Robert C.
Ellickson critiques efficiency theory by pointing out "that the assumption of
rationality exaggerates actual human cognitive capacities, and that, because a
person's received utility is unobservable, the assumption of rational utility-
213. Birmingham, supra note 9, at 292.
214. SMITH, supra note 7, at 418.
215. Id. at 116-17.
216. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989).
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maximization is strictly nonfalsifiable."2 17 Rather than acting out of rational
self-interest, people often act out of lack of information or the inability to
218 219 220process information, irrational nsk-aversion or risk-attraction, malice,
22122revenge, or a host of other human frailties.222  Posner himself writes that
"[p]eople are not always rational ... [a]nd there are situations in which rational
choice is precluded by uncertainty, defined as noncalculable risk." 2 23
In response to this criticism of efficiency theory that it falsely assumes
rational behavior, Posner writes, "[i]t is important to bear in mind that an
assumption is not a finding."224  Elsewhere, Posner explains that theory
necessarily proceeds with simplifications and abstractions: "[A]n economic
theory of law is certain not to capture the full complexity, richness, and
confusion of the phenomena-criminal activity or whatever-that it seeks to
illuminate. That lack of realism does not invalidate the theory; it is, indeed, the
essential precondition of a theory."225
Nonetheless, in selecting from among several legal rules, why not select the
rule that takes account of the possibility of a false assumption, rather than the
rule that is premised on the artificial simplifications and abstractions of pure
theory. This reasoning would advocate for Category 3, which allows for the
possibility that the parent acts against good business judgment, as opposed to
Category 1, which assumes that the parent company always acts rationally to
induce only efficient breaches of contract. Posner goes on to argue that "a
theory cannot be overturned by pointing out its defects or limitations but only
by proposing a more inclusive, more powerful, and above all more useful
theory."226 This is the very goal of the concordant theory of applied pluralism,
217. Id.
218. Id. ("The model assumes that a person can perfectly process available information about
alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility.").
219. Cf Ernst, supra note 66, at 469-70 ("[T]he settlement of litigation is not characterized by
rationality.") (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology ofLitigation, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 113, 114-19, 124-25, 145 (1996) (discussing the role of risk-aversion and risk-attraction in
settling litigation)).
220. Holmes, supra note 51, at 471.
221. Kate Zernike, Jurors Convict 2 Christie Allies in Lane Closings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2016,
at Al (reporting conviction of former aides, to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, of all charges
resulting from the closing of the George Washington Bridge as punishment against a "mayor who
declined to endorse the governor's re-election").
222. See Jon Elster, Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of Rational Behavior, 36 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 179, 179 (1993).
223. POSNER, supra note 10, at 4.
224. Id.




which attempts to select the rule that takes into account multiple theories and
the critiques of those theories.
A more convincing answer to the argument that efficiency theory is
premised on a false assumption of rationality is that, whereas individuals may
act out of irrational disregard for self-interest, business firms are far more likely
to act rationally. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott write that "[t]hese
objections [to efficiency theory] would be troublesome for an efficiency
approach that covered all contract types."227 However, Schwartz and Scott
argue "that they have little force when [firm to firm] contracts alone are
considered."228 Schwartz and Scott reason as follows:
A firm is directed by its owners, who often are shareholders.
Shareholders prefer their firms to maximize profits, which the
shareholders then can consume or save.... No one doubts that
managers sometimes successfully sabotage owners. For two
reasons, however, we will assume that managers obey
shareholder instructions. First, managers sabotage
shareholders either by diverting corporate wealth to
themselves or by failing to take appropriate risks on behalf of
the firm. Managers, however, have no incentive to degrade the
quality of the contracts that they write; after all, these contracts
create the wealth that the managers later can divert. Second,
the legal rules that attempt to deter bad manager behavior fall
in the domains of the criminal, corporate, and securities laws.
Contract law should exploit this specialization by assuming
that the a eements it regulates reflect the parties' maximizing
choices.
Hence, Schwartz and Scott reason that presuming economic rationality by
business firms keeps contract law within its boundaries.230 To the extent there
is "bad manager behavior," that will fall within the realm of other areas of law
to police.231 This reasoning would tend to support the aspect of the Category 3
rule that there should be no tort liability for a parent inducing a breach of
contract unless the conduct constitutes an independent tort. If the conduct is
independently tortious, then the behavior is beyond the realm of contract law
and should be punished as a tort, according to Schwartz and Scott's boundary
theory.232
227. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 545.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 550-51.
230. Id. at 545, 551.
231. Id
232. Id. at 545.
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Schwartz and Scott go on to justify efficiency theory's assumption of
rationality in the context of firm-to-firm contracts as follows:
[T]he pressure to survive promotes competence. This pressure
takes two forms. First, firms that systematically make bad
economic decisions lose out in competition with profit-
maximizing firms. Hence, surviving firms are generally the
ones that can do what they set out to do. Second, employees
who systematically make bad economic decisions are unlikely
to be promoted to positions of responsibility. Hence, senior
managers can generally do what they set out to do. This is not
to say that all firms all the time pursue profit-maximizing
strategies. But it is to say that owners and the market put
systematic pressure on firms to behave optimally; hence, it is a
plausible working assumption that firms rationally pursue the
objective of maximizing profits.233
Hence, according to efficiency theory, we can generally presume that in the
context of firm-to-firm contracts (like those that are the subject of this Article),
parent companies will act rationally and efficiently in their business interest in
determining whether to induce a breach of contract. Accordingly, as a general
rule such breaches should not be punished unless they are independently
tortious. Otherwise, the law will deter and punish efficient breaches of contract.
However, even Schwartz and Scott acknowledge that rational firm behavior
is not always the case. They write, "[t]his is not to say that all firms all the time
pursue profit-maximizing strategies."234 Other defenders of the rationality
assumption also acknowledge that companies do not always act out of rational
235self-interest. Stephen A. Smith agrees with Schwartz and Scott that
companies are more likely to act out of rational economic interest because they
"are required by corporate statute to act for profit. And even if they were not
so required, they would likely go out of business if they failed to act in a self-
interested rational manner."236 But Smith goes on to acknowledge that
[t]he second, more important reason that the unrealistic
assumptions objection is not fatal to efficiency theories of
contract law is that efficiency theories do not require that
everyone, or even the majority of people, act in a rational, self-
interested fashion. It is enough that a significant number of
237
people act in this way.
233. Id. at 551.
234. Id.
235. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 126-27; Coleman, supra note 208, at 523; Elster, supra note
222, at 179; Feinman, supra note 65, at 52.
236. SMITH, supra note 7, at 126-27.
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Hence, efficiency theory applied in this context would be based on the
premise that when a parent company induces the breach of a subsidiary
company's contract, it will usually do so for rational business reasons. But
sometimes it will not. And when the parent's behavior constitutes an
independent ort, then it exceeds the boundaries of contract law and should be
governed by the punitive policies of tort. And in those rare situations when a
parent company acts not to maximize corporate assets but out of malice,
oppression or some other irrational motive, then it is not inducing an efficient
breach of contract and such behavior should also be punished and deterred.
All of this argues for the Rule of Category 3, which shields a parent
company from tort liability for inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract,
except when its conduct constitutes an independent tort or is not justified by
rational, business reasons.2 38  Such a rule protects the large number of
presumably efficient breaches of contract while acknowledging the possibility
that sometimes even private companies fail to act for rational, business reasons.
The Rule of Category 1 fails to take this possibility into account by granting the
parent complete immunity from tort liability. 239 The Rule of Category 2 deters
and punishes all breaches of contract, efficient or otherwise.240 The Rule of
Category 4 punishes many breaches of contracts that the parent induces for
legitimate business reasons, simply because the conduct is adjudged wrongful
241
in a way that can be less than tortious.
Another critique of efficiency theory is that it is not grounded in morality
because it fails to take into account individual rights.242 Efficiency theory
sacrifices the interests of the individual parties to the contract in the name of
the overall maximization of wealth and utility in society.24 3 As Posner writes,
"by aggregating utility across persons, utilitarianism treats people as cells in the
overall social organism rather than as individuals." 244 In the context of the
particular issue at hand, imposing no punishment on parents to deter them from
inducing subsidiaries to breach contracts disregards the right of the non-
breaching party to the contract to make an enforceable contract and see it
performed. One answer to this is that the non-breaching party is sufficiently
compensated by receiving its full expectation damages under the contract.24 5
238. See supra Section II.C.
239. See supra Section IIA.
240. See supra Section [LB.
241. See supra Section IID.
242. SMITH, supra note 7, at 129.
243. Id.
244. POSNER, supra note 10, at 16.
245. SMITH, supra note 7, at 118.
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Another answer to address this is to argue that the overall benefit to society of
increased wealth and utility outweighs the individual interest of the non-
breaching party to see the contract performed.246 But neither of these answers
suffice when the parent company acts, not out of efficient, economic business
interest, but out of malice to harm the non-breaching party or commits an
independent tort. Hence, once again Category 3, which imposes punishment
under such circumstances, is the best rule. Moreover, the advantage of the
concordant approach to selecting contract rules is that we can now apply
individual rights-based theory to the problem at hand, to see if the rule we have
selected adequately safeguards individual rights.
IV. APPLYING RIGHTS-BASED THEORY, TORT LIABILITY SHOULD BE
INCURRED IF THE PARENT CORPORATION FAILS TO ACT IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY OR COMMITS AN INDEPENDENT
TORT
One cannot and should not rest solely on utilitarian theories (such as
efficiency theory) to select the best contract rule to govern a particular situation.
Courts, which are charged with meting out justice to the individual parties
before them, presumably do not focus solely or even primarily on the interests
of society at large. Rather, as Fuller and Perdue observe, "it is impossible to
assume that when a court enforces a promise it necessarily pursues only one
purpose and protects one 'interest."' 247 When one is confronted with a palette
of potential rules, the best rule is the rule that serves both societal interests and
protects the rights of the parties. Hence, having determined that efficiency
theory favors a rule holding a parent company immune from tort liability for
inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract, except when the parent acts without
regard to rational business interest or commits an independent tort, we now
consider whether rights-based theories of contract support the same rule.
Rights-based theories explain and advocate for contract rules that uphold
248the individual rights of the parties to a contract. A foundational component
of individual liberty is the freedom to order one's own affairs on one's own
249terms through the making of private contracts. In order to protect this
freedom of contract, the promises enshrined in contracts must be enforceable.
250
246. Id. at 126.
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The promissory theory of contract, most eloquently articulated by Charles
Fried, urges that "respect for others as free and rational requires taking seriously
their capacity to determine their own values."251 Fried argues that we enforce
contractual promises because "holding people to their obligations is a way of
taking them seriously."25 2 Moreover, having invoked the social and legal
conventions of private contracts, which are designed to protect our individual
liberties, the parties to a contract have a moral obligation either to keep their
promises or pay compensation for breaking them.253
Does this moral obligation to honor promises apply to a parent company
who inherits the contracts of a subsidiary it acquires? Freedom of contract
requires that we only enforce promises that are voluntarily undertaken and
25
accepted. 2 Charles Fried explains that "[t]he need for acceptance shows the
moral relation of promising to be voluntary on both sides."2 55 As Randy Barnett
phrases it, "enforcement is not morally justified without a genuine commitment
by the person who is to be subjected to a legal sanction."256 One might argue
that there is no moral justification for holding a parent company to a contractual
promise it never made in the first place. But even in the case where a parent
acquires a subsidiary after the subsidiary entered into the contract in question,
the parent company presumably had a full opportunity to discover and examine
the subsidiary's existing contractual obligations. In voluntarily acquiring the
subsidiary, the parent company voluntarily inherited the subsidiary's
contractual promises, and liberty does not suffer if we hold the parent to those
promises.
Moreover, an alternative rights-based theory of contract, the reliance
theory, also demands that the parent be held to the contractual promises of its
subsidiary. The reliance theory posits that contract rules are explained and
justified by the need to protect the party who has relied to its detriment on the
promises enshrined in contracts.257 There is a pressing moral case for protecting
a party that has relied on the institution of a binding contract to incur expenses
and forego alternative business opportunities. As Fuller and Perdue write,
"[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he may
not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more pressing case
251. FRIED, supra note 15, at 20.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 16 ("An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the
promised performance.")
254. Id. at 43.
255. Id.
256. Barnett, supra note 7, at 272.
257. Id. at 274.
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for relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his
disappointment in not getting what was promised him." 258 If we are to apply a
truly concordant approach, we have to consider reliance theory in addition to
promissory theory. Where a parent has acquired a subsidiary corporation,
parties who have contracts with the subsidiary corporation face the danger that
their reliance interests will be frustrated should the parent decide to terminate
those contracts.259 Those reliance interests must be protected, not only to
protect the individual interests of the non-breaching party, but because we want
to facilitate a system whereby businesses can rationally rely on private contracts
to make investments, plan, and order their affairs.260
Accordingly, a parent company should be bound to the contracts of its
subsidiary to the same extent as its subsidiary is bound to those contracts-but
not to a greater extent. Particularly because the parent never made the
contractual promises in the first place, and never induced the reliance that
resulted from those promises, it would be a perverse set of rules that punished
the parent more severely for inducing a breach of contract than it punished the
subsidiary who actually entered into the contract. Under both promissory and
reliance theories of contract, the proper measure of damages is compensatory
damages, not punitive damages.
The "normal" measure of damages for breach of contract is expectation
damages under both reliance theory and promissory theory. The need to protect
against reliance injury results in an award of expectation damages because
expectation encompasses reliance injury in two distinct ways.261 First, if one
expects to make a profit under a contract, that necessarily includes "(1)
reimbursement for what has been done, and (2) a profit in addition."26 2 Hence,
expectation damages compensate for the reliance damages resulting from "what
has been done." But there is another type of reliance harm which is not
compensated by only reimbursing for "what has been done": in reliance on the
contract, the promisee may forego other business opportunities. "Hence, the
reliance interest must be interpreted as at least potentially covering 'gains
prevented' as well as 'losses caused."'263 But opportunities lost and gains
prevented are difficult to prove and quantify, and so, according to Fuller and
Perdue, the law awards expectation damages as a "prophylaxis" against such
258. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 56.
259. See supra Section II.A.
260. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 62 (referring to "the need for facilitating reliance on
business agreements").
261. Id at 74.
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harm. The expectation damages award "is a cure for these losses in the sense
that it offers the measure of recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for
the (often very numerous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and
forbearances which make up his total reliance on the contract."2 65 In addition
to protecting this interest, the availability of expectation damages encourage
businesses to rely on the enforceability of private contracts in making
266investments. Hence, expectation damages are the preferred remedy even for
a reliance theorist for two reasons: "(1) [T]he need for curing and preventing
the harms occasioned by reliance, and (2) . .. the need for facilitating reliance
on business agreements."2
67
Promissory theory also embraces compensatory damages (and in particular
expectation damages) as a limit on damages for breach of contract. The moral
obligation to keep a contractual promise means that the promisor should either
perform the contract or "hand over the equivalent of the promised
performance."268 Fried writes that expectation damages are appropriate
because "[t]he expectation standard gives the victim of a breach no more or less
than he would have had had there been no breach-in other words, he gets the
benefit of his bargain."269
But if there is a moral obligation to keep a contractual promise, why not
punish a breach of contract with punitive damages, as we punish torts such as
fraud and misrepresentation? According to promissory theory, the reason
breaches are not punished is that a contract represents a dual promise.
Contemporary promissory theorists Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz write
that a contract is a promise "either to trade goods or services to buyers or to
make a monetary transfer to buyers, equal to the value the buyers would realize
from receiving the goods or services [i.e., an expectation value]."2 70 This
concept of the dual promise has long been enshrined in our law. Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote in the nineteenth century that "[t]he duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it,-and nothing else."271 If punitive damages beyond such compensation are
awarded for breach of contract, it violates freedom of contract by imposing on
parties something far beyond what they bargained for.272 Markowitz and
264. Id. at 60-61.
265. Id. at 60.
266. Id. at 61-62.
267. Id. at 62.
268. FRIED, supra note 15, at 17.
269. Id. (emphasis added).
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Schwartz add, "Because dual performance contracts leave the contracting
parties in control of the substance of their obligations, and, in particular,
because they do not impose any obligations that the parties did not agree to ex
ante, they better respect freedom of contract."273
Hence, under a rights-based theory, a parent company who inherits the
contracts of a newly acquired subsidiary should not be punished with tort
liability for terminating those contracts. The parent company inherits the
responsibility for respecting the non-breaching party's reliance interest in the
existing contract, and so must pay compensation if it breaches the contract. The
parent company, moreover, voluntarily inherits the moral obligation to keep the
dual promise enshrined in its subsidiary's contract: either to see that the contract
is performed or pay compensation. But it would violate the freedom of contract
of the parent company if it were further punished for directing the termination
of subsidiary contracts, particularly where the parent never made the promise
or induced the reliance in the first place.
Accordingly, applying rights-based theory, the rule of Category 3 is again
the best rule to govern when a parent company should be liable in tort for
inducing the breach of a subsidiary contract. Parents should be immune from
tort liability unless they act out of malice and bad faith or commit an
independent tort. The imposition of tort liability for terminations undertaken
not for good faith business reasons, finds its justification in rights-based
274contract theory's emphasis on good faith in the performance of a contract.
Respect for the institution of private contract as an institution that guards
individual liberty requires that society "condemn chicanery and sharp practice
in the carrying out of contractual obligations."275 A parent company that
voluntarily inherits a subsidiary contract also inherits the obligation to perform
that contract in good faith. Under the dual-performance conception of a
contract, this means that the parent has an obligation either to perform the
contract or to terminate it for good faith reasons and pay compensation. A
termination undertaken for malice and oppression violates this duty and society
can rightfully punish it. And if the termination of the contract constitutes an
independent ort such as fraud, then we have left the realm of contract law and
entered the realm of torts, in which society has a legitimate interest in punishing
and deterring such behavior.
273. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 811.
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The practical task of selecting among legal rules requires that we first
acknowledge that no single normative theory can explain or justify a social and
legal institution as old and complicated as contracts. A pluralist society
demands a pluralist approach to selecting contract rules. Under this concordant
approach, any rule we select should be justified by both utilitarian theories,
because it recognizes the interests of society, and by rights-based theories,
because it does justice to the individual parties to the contract. In this Article I
have attempted to demonstrate that such a concordant approach to normative
contract theory is possible by addressing the problem of whether and when a
parent company should be held liable in tort for directing the breach of a
subsidiary's contract. Under both the dominant utilitarian theory of our time
(efficiency theory), and the dominant rights-based theories of our time
(promissory and reliance theories), a parent should be held liable in tort for
intentional interference with a subsidiary contract only where it fails to act for
rational business reasons or where it commits an independent ort.
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